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A final warning should be offered against drawing absolute con-
clusions. For example, Brown seemingly allows employers in an asso-
ciation to treat all union employees as strikers once one company has
been subjected to an economic strike. Nevertheless, it does not neces-
sarily follow that employers can permanently replace the employees
who did not in fact strike." The Board and the courts will still
attempt to balance the opposing interests equitably in each individual
case. Moreover, the Board will probably continue to be recognized as
the body with expertise to balance judiciously such interests.
The "beefed-up" lockout, then, is not the ultimate weapon. It is,
however, a great improvement over weapons previously allowed.
Its greatest use probably will occur at the "cold war" bargaining
table. Unions should not fear a tremendous increase in lockouts them-
selves. They should be ready, though, to approach negotiations with
new respect for employers' ability to deal through strength.
James H. Wallenstein
Constitutional Law - Pointer v. Texas - Guarantee of
an Accused's Right to Confront the Witnesses
Against Him in a State Proceeding
According to Federal Standards
I. THE TREND TOWARD "INCORPORATION"
The language of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution makes no mention of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Justice
Black has vigorously contended that section 1 of the amendment
was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights.! While some historical
evidence tends to support the argument that Congress intended in-
72 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telephone Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
In Adamson v. California, Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent, stated: "I would follow
what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the
people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights." Justice Douglas joined
Black in his dissent, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947). Felix Frankfurter, a staunch adversary of
Black's theory, defined the term incorporation as follows: "The sense of the word 'incor-
porate' implies simultaneity. One writes a document incorporating another by reference at
the time of the writing." Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights Into The Due Process Clause of The Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HAgv. L. REv. 746,
748 (1965).
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corporation,' it is equally clear that the states and the general public
did not.4
The early case history clearly shows that the judiciary did not
interpret the amendment as incorporating the Bill of Rights. In
Twitchell v. Commonwealth,5 decided in 1868, the Supreme Court,
though making no mention of the new amendment, held that the
fifth and sixth amendments restricted only federal power. As author-
ity, the Court cited Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's statements in Barron
v. City of Baltimore:' "These amendments contain no expression indi-
cating an intention to apply them to State governments. This Court
cannot so apply them."7 In subsequent years, when faced with the
question of the relation of the fourteenth amendment to the Bill of
Rights, the Court refused to renounce this authority!
In Twining v. New Jersey' the Court held that the "privileges and
immunities" clause did not "forbid the States to abridge the personal
rights enumerated in the first eight Amendments. . . ."" but went
on to say that if some of the personal rights so enumerated are
safeguarded against state action, it would be because they are of
such a nature as to be "included in the concept of due process of
law. . . ."" Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court in Palko v.
Connecticut," said that the immunities which, since Twining, had
been found to be enforceable against the states'3 were so found be-
cause they were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and that
this process of "absorption" is based upon the belief that "neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' 4
In 1947 the "incorporation" issue was squarely faced by the Court.
Adamson v. California," a five-four decision, rejected Mr. Justice
3See appendix to Black's dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 92
(1947). Contra, Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 SrAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); See also note 4, infra.
4 Note, Constitutional Law-Was it Intended That the Fourteenth Amendment Incor-
porate the Bill of Rights?, 42 N. C. L. REV. 925 (1964).
574 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868).
10 U.S. (7 Peters) 464 (1833).
Id. at 468.
sWest v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899);
Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
'211 U.S. 78 (1908).
oId. at 99.
"Ibid.
"302 U.S. 319 (1937).
"De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of speech and peaceable assem-
bly); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (freedom of press); Hamilton
v. Regents, 193 U.S. 245 (1934) (free exercise of religion); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932) (right to counsel). Chicago B. Q. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)
(just compensation clause of the fifth amendment), had been decided prior to Twining.
14302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
'5332 U.S. 46 (1947). Despite Mr. Justice Black's lengthy appendix, Mr. Justice Reed,
speaking for the Court said that nothing had been called to the attention of the majority
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Black's "incorporation" theory and affirmed the "natural law" theory
of Palko. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the self-
incrimination clause of the fifth amendment applied to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Twining Court had previously rejected a contention that the "privi-
leges and immunities" clause made the self-incrimination clause ap-
plicable to the states." Seventeen years later Adamson was overruled
by Malloy v. Hogan" in which the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment guaranteed the petitioner the protection of the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination in a state proceeding.
In the time between Adamson and Malloy the Court held that the
fourteenth amendment guarantees against infringement by the states
the liberties of the fourth amendment,"8 the eighth amendment's pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual punishment," and the sixth amend-
ment's guarantee of assistance of counsel for an accused in a criminal
prosecution." This line of cases culminating in Malloy evidenced a
trend away from the "natural law" theory of Palko and toward the
doctrine of "selective incorporation." Malloy rejected the theory of
"wholesale incorporation" of the Bill of Rights, and accepted an ap-
proach which is a kind of " 'incorporation' in snatches."" As a result
the Court no longer was concerned solely with whether the state
court's proceedings met the demands of fundamental fairness which
due process embodies, but also with whether the proceedings com-
plied with federal standards, i.e., the extent to which the federal
courts had guaranteed a specific provision of the Bill of Rights." In
Malloy, Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the va-
lidity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution,
depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.
Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an accused's
silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified."
that would indicate that either the framers of the fourteenth amendment or the states in-
tended that the due process clause draw within its scope any of the earlier amendments. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, stated that an amendment, since it is pro-
posed for public adoption, should be read in a sense most obvious to the common under-
standing at the time of its adoption. This reasoning, from an historical standpoint, com-
pletely negates Black's "intent to incorporate" theory.
'6211 U.S. 78 (1908).
17378 U.S. 1 (1964).
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"0 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), noted 18 Sw. L. J. 284 (1964).
"Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14, 27 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2" Ibid.
2378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
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With the "natural law" theory of Palko rejected in favor of "selec-
tive incorporation," the federal standards became as important as
the prevailing state practice in a state proceeding.
II. AN ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES
AGAINST HIM
A. Federal Standards
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states in
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
• . .to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . ." As early
as 1899, the right of confrontation was recognized as one of the
"fundamental guarantees of life and liberty."' Included in the right
of confrontation is the right to look upon the witnesses, to cross-
examine them, and to impeach their testimony in every method
authorized by the rules of criminal procedure. 5 The presumption of
the innocence of the accused relates to every fact which must be estab-
lished to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A failure to afford
these rights would in effect deny the presumption by failing to give
the accused an opportunity to question the veracity of the facts estab-
lished by an unconfronted witness."6 Even though the right is funda-
mental, it is not absolute, and the Court continues to recognize as
exceptions to the general rule the admissibility of dying declarations, 7
recorded testimony taken at a former trial where the witness died
before the second trial,"8 and testimony of a witness whose absence
was due to the procurement of the defendant.6
In West v. Louisiana,"0 after recognizing the right as fundamental,
the Court held that the sixth amendment did not apply to proceed-
ings in state courts, and therefore, where a state denied the accused
the right to confront the witnesses against him, the only question
before the Court was whether there was a denial of due process.
After recognizing the exceptions to be allowed, the West Court went
on to say any further exceptions should be decided by the state courts
subject to the due process requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 1
' Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). See also, Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466 (1965); In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
2 Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
26Ibid.
27Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
2SMattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
"' Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
20 194 U.S. 258 (1904).




Article 1, section 10 of the Texas Constitution states: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall . . . be confronted by the
witnesses against him . . . except that when the witnesses reside out
of the State . . . . the defendant and the State shall have the right
to produce and have the evidence admitted by deposition, under
such rules and laws as the Legislature may hereafter provide. . ....
The Legislature has provided that the deposition of a witness taken
in an examining trial in the presence of the defendant and where the
defendant himself had the privilege of cross-examining the witness,
may be read at the trial of the accused"2 upon oath of any credible
person that the witness resides out of the state."
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted these statu-
tory provisions as applying equally to cases in which the evidence is
offered by the accused, as to those in which it is offered by the state,
and further, that there is no need to exercise diligence to require the
presence of a witness in order to reproduce his prior testimony.' Where
the evidence shows that the defendant was not given the right to cross-
examine the witness at the examining trial, the witness' testimony
cannot be introduced. 5 But where the opportunity to cross-examine
was afforded," the testimony is admissible regardless of whether
the defendant was represented by counsel at the time." Texas, there-
fore, has recognized not only the exceptions conceded by the United
States Supreme Court,s but also the exception of reproducing testi-
mony where the witness resides out of the state and the defendant,





TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 750 (1941).
33 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 749 (1941).
4 Webb. v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 144, 268 S.W.2d 136 (1954).
85 Gill v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 508, 188 S.W.2d 584 (1945).
36Cumpston v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 385, 235 S.W.2d 446 (1950).3 7
Young v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 257, 199 S.W. 479 (1917).
38Garcia v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 593, 210 S.W.2d 574 (1948); McMurry v. State,
145 Tex. Crim. 439, 168 S.W.2d 858 (1943); and see cases cited in notes 27-29 supra.
"0 The right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him has long been held to
be a fundamental right. See note 24 supra. In recent years the Court has not hesitated to
hold that certain fundamental rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights cannot be denied in
state proceedings because these rights are guaranteed, through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, against infringement by the states. See notes 18-21 supra.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), established the test of determining whether a funda-
mental right had been denied in a state proceeding, as being whether or not the funda-
mental right was afforded in the same manner in which federal courts afford the right,
i.e., according to "federal standards." This exception allowed by the Texas courts had not
been recognized by the federal courts, therefore, it was not in accordance with the federal
standards of granting the accused the right to confront the witnesses against him. In light
of the Court's decisions that guarantee an indigent defendant charged with a felony the
right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and that the defendant is
[Vol. 19
III. POINTER V. TEXAS"0
Pointer and Dillard were arrested in Texas and taken before a
state judge for an examining trial on a charge of robbery." An
assistant district attorney was present and acted as prosecutor, but
Pointer and Dillard were without counsel. Phillips, the victim of
the robbery, identified Pointer as the man who robbed him at gun-
point, and while Dillard attempted to cross-examine Phillips, Pointer
did not. After Pointer was indicted and before his trial, Phillips
moved to California. At the trial, Phillips' testimony was allowed as
evidence over the continual objections of Pointer's counsel because,
in the trial court's view, the defendant had had adequate opportunity
to cross-examine Phillips. Pointer contended that he was denied due
process because (1) counsel had not been appointed prior to indict-
ment, and (2) he was denied the right to confront the witnesses
against him. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that because
the examining trial is only for the purpose of determining whether
the defendant is to be discharged, committed to jail, or admitted to
bail;42 because there was no statutory provision requiring appoint-
ment of counsel prior to indictment; and because no pleas of guilty
or not guilty are taken, the fact that Pointer was not represented
by counsel at the examining trial was not a denial of due process.
As Pointer had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses at the
examining trial, his right of confrontation was not denied."
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that the confrontation guarantee of the sixth amendment is to be
enforced against the states under the fourteenth amendment accord-
ing to the "same standards" that protect this personal right against
federal encroachment. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court,
reviewed the past decisions" which recognized the right of con-
frontation as fundamental and concluded that sufficient precedent
had been established to hold that a denial of the right would be a
entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)
(which has been interpreted in the federal courts as a guarantee of counsel at a preliminary
hearing), Edwards v. United States, 139 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1943), citing Wood v. United
States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942), the exception allowed by the Texas courts, whereby
the defendant, with or without counsel, is afforded the right of confrontation at an exam-
ining trial, would not comply with federal standards of granting an indigent defendant the
right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment and applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment.
40380 U.S. 400 (1965).
41 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1408 (1953).
"TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. Art. 261 (1954).
"3Pointer v. State, 375 S.W.2d 293 (1963).
"Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959);
In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); Kirby
v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
NOTES196 5]
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denial of due process of law. Because the exception allowed by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had not been recognized by the
Supreme Court's prior decisions45 and was not in accordance with
the federal standards, the Court held that the sixth amendment's
guarantee was unquestionably denied Pointer. The Court went on
to say that those exceptions which previously had been allowed
were not contradicted by Pointer. More significantly, the Court said
that if petitioner had been represented by counsel at the examining
trial, the case would have been a quite different one. In fact, a prior
Supreme Court decision supports this statement. In West v. Louisi-
ana," the Court held that where the witness had been cross-examined
by the defendant's counsel in a hearing before a committing magi-
strate, and the witness' attendance could not be procured at the
trial, the introduction of his testimony was not a denial of due
process.
While the Court reserved the question of whether failure to
appoint counsel to represent petitioner at the examining trial denied
him his constitutional rights as guaranteed by Gideon v. Wain-
right,47 the Court stated:
Because the transcript of Phillips' statement offered against petitioner
at his trial had not been taken at a time and under circumstances afford-
ing petitioner through counsel an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
Phillips, its introduction in a federal court in a criminal case against
Pointer would have amounted to a denial of the privilege of con-
frontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."
Since petitioner actually had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, it seems clear that Gideon's guarantee of right-to-counsel was
the controlling force of the decision, i.e., the Court's quarrel is with
the fact that there was no opportunity to cross-examine through
counsel.
While all of the Justices agreed that petitioner was denied the right
of confrontation assured by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, Justices Harlan and Stewart did not join in the Court's
holding that the right of confrontation, as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment, was obligatory on the states according to federal stand-
ards. Mr. Justice Goldberg, on the other hand, expressly stated in
his concurring opinion that he subscribed to the process whereby
fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights are "absorbed" by the
fourteenth amendment and thereby applied to the states. The result
" See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
4' 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
47372 U.S. 335 (1963), noted 18 Sw. L. J. 284 (1964).
48380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
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of these opinions is a rehearing of the "incorporation v. natural law"
controversy.
Mr. Justice Goldberg contended that the language of Twining v.
New Jersey" makes it clear that those rights which the fourteenth
amendment is held to protect, will be protected in all cases where
they have been denied, not just the cases where, after considering all
the facts and circumstances, it seems fair to a majority of the Court
to afford the protection. Goldberg further contended that even
though a state should be able to serve as a "laboratory" and try novel
social and economic experiments, 0 this does not include the power to
experiment with fundamental liberties safeguarded by the Bill of
Rights. He refers to the "natural law" theory, which would allow
the Court, after considering the factual circumstances of each case,
to determine whether a practice was sufficiently repugnant to the
notion of due process as to be forbidden as "extremely subjective and
excessively discretionary."'" Such a practice would lessen predicta-
bility and increase discord between state and federal legal processes.
Rather than increasing federal power, Goldberg contended, the
"absorption process" acts to limit state power in accordance with
federal standards and thus, safeguard the individual's fundamental
rights and liberties in state and federal proceedings equally.
Mr. Justice Harlan contended that the decision is another step
toward adoption of the long since discredited" "incorporation" doc-
trine, and that "incorporation," whether selective or total, is his-
torically and constitutionally unsound." Justice Harlan maintained
that the sound basis for reversing the judgment is that the right of
confrontation is " 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' . . . re-
flected in the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment inde-
pendently of the sixth."' 4 Harlan reasoned that this standard recog-
nizes that the Constitution is tolerative, rather than prohibitive, of
differences in the manner by which state and federal governments
execute their legitimate concerns, and further stated:
"Selective" incorporation or "absorption" amounts to little more than
a diluted form of the full incorporation theory. Whereas it rejects full
incorporation because of recognition that not all of the guarantees of
49 Notes 9-11 supra. It would take a very liberal construction of Twining to reach such
a conclusion.
"°New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 341 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
5'380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965).
12 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
53 See Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. Ruv. 746 (1965).
54380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965).
NOTES1965 ]
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the Bill of Rights should be deemed "fundamental," it at the same time
ignores the possibility that not all phases of any given guarantee de-
scribed in the Bill of Rights are necessarily fundamental.5
Since all the justices agreed that petitioner was denied due process
as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, and that Pointer could
have been reversed on that basis solely, Mr. Justice Stewart referred
to the Court's holding that the sixth amendment's guarantee was
obligatory on the states as a "questionable tour de force."5 It is clear
that the Court does not wish to follow Mr. Justice Black's "total
incorporation" theory, nor does it wish to adhere to the "natural
law" theory of Palko. However, Pointer is justified by the fact that
the Court's choice of the middle course, i.e., "selective incorporation"
or, "absorption," means that a majority of the present Court con-
sider the specifics of the Bill of Rights as more dependable than nine
shifting consciences."'
IV. CONCLUSION
As no pleas of guilty or not guilty are accepted in a Texas "examin-
ing trial," the Court reserved the question of whether that stage
was so "cricital" to the defendant as to call for appointment of
counsel." Because a defendant may make a statement at the examin-
ing trial which can later be used against him," and because his liberty
until the trial on the merits is in question, 60 it would seem that the
examining trial is such a critical stage as to require counsel. Powell
v. Alabama"1 states that a defendant is entitled to counsel at every
step of the proceedings, and this decision has been cited as authority
for the requirement of representation by counsel in a federal pre-
liminary hearing." While the Supreme Court has not dealt with the
question of appointing counsel at such a state hearing, except where
pleas of guilty or not guilty were taken, " the language of Pointer,
plus the fact that a defendant is entitled to see his retained counsel
upon request after becoming a "suspect,"" should be sufficient prece-
dent to require appointment of counsel at this time.
Since Pointer strongly implies that the testimony of an absent
Slid. at 409.
56 380 U.S. 400, 410 (1965).
"Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175, 179 (1952) (concurring opinions).
58380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
"gTEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 247 (1954).6 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 261 (1954).61287 U.S. 45 (1932).
62 Edwards v. United States, 139 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1943), citing Wood v. United
States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"
2 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
64Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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witness could be used if the defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine through counsel, appointment of counsel at the Texas
examining trial would be the only practical way to preserve the
use of such testimony. The new Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
effective January 1, 1966, seems to remedy the procedure which
resulted in the reversal of Pointer's conviction. Although the pro-
visions dealing directly with confrontation of witnesses and the
reading of depositions of an absent witness have not been changed "
substantially, the new code expressly provides that in any case under
the code, the person arrested shall be: taken immediately before a
magistrate;" informed inter alia, of his right to retain counsel; allowed
to request appointment of counsel if he is not able to obtain one; and
given reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel. The lan-
guage of the code makes it mandatory that the person arrested be in-
formed of his right to an examining trial, and upon such examining
trial the accused shall have a "sufficient time" to obtain counsel." Be-
cause the person arrested is to be afforded a reasonable time to consult
with his counsel, and no distinction is made between one who obtains
counsel on his own and one who requests that counsel be appointed,
it appears that an indigent defendant will have the opportunity of
being represented by counsel through every stage of the proceedings
against him.6
"STEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.25 (1965), effective January 1, 1966: "The defendant,
upon a trial, shall be confronted with the witnesses, except in certain cases provided for in
this Code where depositions have been taken." TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 39.01 (1965),
effective January 1, 1966, enumerates as exceptions the cases where the defendant was present
and was afforded the privilege of cross-examining the witness when the testimony was taken
at an examining trial, jury of inquest, or a prior trial of the defendant for the same offense,
and 1) the witness resides out of the state, 2) the witness has died since the testimony was
taken, 3) the witness was prevented from attending by procurement of the other party or
one seeking to deprive the defendant of the benefit of such testimony, or 4) the witness is
unable to attend because of age or bodily infirmity. Upon proof of one of the situations
above, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 39.12 (1965), effective January 1, 1966, allows the
testimony to be read at the trial.
66 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.06 (1965), effective January 1, 1966: "In each case
enumerated in this Code, the person making the arrest shall immediately take the person
arrested before the magistrate who may have ordered the arrest or before some magistrate of
the county where the arrest was made without an order. The magistrate shall immediately
perform the duties described in Art. 15.17 of this Code."
"
7
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 15.17 (1965), effective January 1, 1966:
In each case enumerated in this Code, the person making the arrest shall im-
mediately take the person arrested before some magistrate of the county where
the accused was arrested. The magistrate shall inform the person arrested of
the accusation against him and of any affidavit filed therewith, of his right to
retain counsel, and of his right to have an examining trial. He shall also in-
form the person arrested that he is not required to make a statement and that
any statement made by him may be used against him. The magistrate shall
allow the person reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall
admit the person arrested to bail if allowed by law.
6 6 A shadow of doubt is cast by article 16.01 of the new code which provides: "In a
proper case, the magistrate may appoint counsel to represent the accused in such examining
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Because the Court was silent on the question, it remains to be seen
whether Pointer will have both prospective and retrospective applica-
tion. Even though in the recent decision of Linkletter v. Walker"'
the Court rejected a contention that an absolute rule of retroaction
prevails in the area of constitutional adjudication, it appears that
Pointer will follow the rationale of other cases which have been
applied retroactively." The Linkletter Court stated that the issue of
retrospective application of each case will be decided by "looking
to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect,
and whether retrospective application will further or retard its opera-
tion."" The Court refused to apply retroactively Mapp v. Ohio,"2
the case in question, because the ultimate purpose of Mapp was solely
to deter and restrain police officers from making illegal searches and
seizures. The fairness of the trial was in no sense under attack. Using
the test of Linkletter, it seems apparent that Pointer, where the fair-
ness of the trial was directly in question, will merit retrospective
application. The right of confrontation has long been held to be
fundamental, and the purpose of the rule is aimed at the "very
integrity of the fact finding process.""5 The evidence obtained from
a witness whom the accused had no opportunity to cross-examine
through counsel would be of questionable reliability and could
substantially affect the fairness of the trial.74 Retrospective application
of Pointer would further its operation by assuring a trial with full
judicial protection.
Robert B. Davis
trial only. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 16.01 (1965), effective January 1, 1966. The
language of this provision is confusing when considered in connection with other provisions
of the code which deal with right to counsel. While it was most likely intended to be a
practical aid to both the courts and attorneys, it may be construed as a qualification of these
other provisions, and if so, the admission at a trial of any deposition of a witness who resides
out of the state, and which was taken while the accused was without counsel, will be a
denial of due process of law under the decision of Pointer.
"9381 U.S. 618 (1965).
7 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), noted 18 Sw. L. J. 729 (1964); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), noted 18 Sw. L. J. 284 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
'381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
72367 U.S. 643 (1961).
73381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
' The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the right of the
accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him are both fundamental rights, and a
denial of either is a denial of due process. However, evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal search and seizure is generally reliable evidence, and the facts established by its intro-
duction, while damaging, are more often than not, truthful. On the other hand, the testi-
mony of a witness whom the defendant has had no opportunity to cross-examine through
counsel is of questionable veracity. Because the trial is supposed to be a proceeding between
equal adversaries and is aimed at finding the truth, a defendant who is not afforded the
right to confront the witnesses against him is at a definite disadvantage, and any evidence
admitted which is derived from an unconfronted witness' testimony may result in un-
justifiable harm to the defendant.
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